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Abstract 
This study extensively investigated effectiveness of corporate 
governance in Nigerian banks for the period 2006-2018. The study adopted 
secondary data obtained from annual reports of banks, Central Bank of Nigeria 
and Nigeria Stock Exchange. Regression analysis, unit roots and diagnostic 
test were used in the analysis. The Granger Causality test was applied to 
determine the direction of causality. The findings show that board audit 
committee has positive effect on net profit margin while block-shareholding 
and board composition has negative relationship on growth in revenue and 
growth in net income. It recommends optimum proportion of outside directors 
for effective governance impacting performance positively. 
 
Keywords: Corporate governance, Effectiveness, Performance, Nigerian 
Banks 
 
Introduction 
  Since banks are important institutions for growth, it is crucial to 
understand the key factor for maximizing performance, and their role in 
growing an economy. Abobakr  (2017) opined that bank governance became 
a subject of empirical studies only recently,  especially after the occurrence of 
the recent  financial crisis. The banking industry globally has witnessed a lot 
of reforms over a period of time ranging from size, audit committee, board 
composition, block shareholding, operations and processes. With the attendant 
concentration at which these changes in the banking industry occur, there is 
need for banks to beef up its corporate governance environment.  Poor 
corporate governance may contribute to bank failure which may have 
significant public cost and consequences (Rahman and Islam 2018, Hajer and 
Anis, 2016, Onofrei, Firtescu, and Terinte, 2018).    
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Several studies by authors like Egungwu and Egunwu 2018, Adigwe, 
Nwanna and John 2016, Ugwuanyi and Amanze, 2014) who in their consensus 
views concluded that the failure of banks in Nigeria and elsewhere has been 
largely due to merely inadequate corporate governance and failure of 
professional ethics. This is manifested in numerous instances of creative 
accounting practices, professional insensitive internal control and risk 
management. Non adherence to corporate governance was identified as one of 
the critical issues in virtually all known instances of financial distress in the 
past. It also led to the development of the 13point agenda which was 
introduced in 2004 by the Central Bank administration in Nigeria to promote 
a different set of corporate governance in that era. Tijjani and Anifowose 
(2013) suggests that the poor performance of boards in 2009 which almost led 
to the near collapse of nine banks including the collapse of oceanic and 
intercontinental banks has eroded investors’ confidence in banks leading them 
into divesting their investments and has painted a poor image on the financial 
sector.   
Corporate governance in the banking industry provides the platform 
that is used to attract investors both local and foreign with the trust that their 
investment will be safe and properly utilized in the best possible means of 
managing an investment (Fanta, Kemai and Waka 2013, Mohammed and 
Fayrouk 2014, Abdulazeez, Ndibe and Mercy 2016). Dharmastuti and 
Wahyudi (2013) suggested that in an organization, especially a public 
corporation, functional specialization is required in order to achieve more 
efficient goals. Thus an efficient governance structure must be effective in 
alleviation of such giant problem (the agency problem) and ultimately 
resulting in a better performance (Naushadi and Malik, 2015).  Shareholders 
demand high proficiency on the part of managers with the ultimate aim of 
delivering high returns given the inclement investment climate.  Certain 
factors influence shareholder value more than others which include among 
others are impacted firm value and stock returns (Zadollah and Mohsen 2015, 
Adekunle  and Aghedo 2014).  
There have been conflicting views on the result of different studies 
done on corporate governance and bank performance. Some studies done in 
Nigeria which include Muhammad and Fayrouk (2014), Onakoya, Ofoegu and 
Fasanya (2012) discovered a positive relationship between corporate 
governance and bank performance. While some other studies which were 
carried out in Pakistan by, Marcinkowska (2012) in Poland, Reskino (2013) in 
Indonesia indicate a negative relationship between corporate governance and 
bank performance with similar time series characteristic of data. Kumar and 
Singh (2012) established that corporate governance has a significant effect on 
bank performance in India. Authors like Love and Rachinsky (2013) and 
Naushadi and Malik (2015) in Russia and Canada respectively discovered that 
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studies have failed to establish a link between the standard in corporate 
governance and performance.   
 
Literature Review 
Corporate governance for banks may be described as the way in which 
the activities and business of the banks are conducted and governed by the 
management team and board. Basically, corporate governance in the nation’s 
banking system provides the structure and processes within which the business 
of bank is conducted with the ultimate objective of realizing long term 
shareholders value while taking into account the interest of all other legitimate 
stakeholders (Uwuigbe 2013). This study anchors on agency theory. In agency 
theory, Berle and Means (1962) noted that with the separation of ownership 
and control, and the wide dispersion of ownership, there was effectively no 
check upon the executive autonomy of corporate managers. This theory as it 
relates to corporate governance suggests a fundamental problem for absent or 
distant owners/shareholders who employ professional executives to act on 
their behalf. This raises the prospect that the executive, as agent, will serve 
their own interests rather than those of the owner/principal. The shareholders 
therefore will have to incur agency costs; costs that arise from the need of 
creating incentives that align the interests of the executive with those of the 
shareholder, and costs incurred by the necessity of monitoring executive 
conduct to prevent the abuse of owner interests. Some of the managers do not 
own major stake in the bank and may not gain much reward as compared to 
their corporate input as increasing the value of the bank or also absorb cost in 
terms of loss.   
The shareholder theory was proposed by Milton Friedman (1966), and 
it states that the major aim of a business is to make profit. The theory is based 
on the subject that managers are employed as professional executives (agents) 
to manage the firm for the owners on their behalf. Shareholders are primarily 
concerned with value efficiency and want to control management so that the 
managers will be accountable to the owners. The process and instrument of 
governance in the firm is the interest of the shareholders, for they expect 
accountability to owners and make decision/elect directors and auditors. The 
governance of the firm ultimately influences such rights and relationships. The 
only qualification on the rule to make as much money as possible is conformity 
to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those 
embodied in ethical custom. A focus on short term strategy and greater risk 
taking are just two of the inherent dangers involved.  
 
Empirical Review 
Srairi (2015) investigated the impact of the level of corporate 
governance disclosure on bank performance by constructing a corporate 
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governance disclosure index (CGDI) for 27 Islamic banks operating in five 
Arab Gulf countries. Using content analysis on the banks’ annual reports for 
3 years (2011-2013), the composite index construction uses information on six 
important corporate governance mechanisms, namely board structure, risk 
management, transparency and disclosure, audit committee, Sharia 
supervisory board and investment account holders. The result indicates that 
board audit committee increases the net income of Islamic banks. In a related 
study by Bahreini and Zain (2013), they studied the impact of corporate 
governance characteristics specifically board of directors and audit committee 
on performance of Malaysian banking sector. In this study, sample include one 
set of original data, financial information was obtained from the annual reports 
of thirty banks in Malaysia between the period 2005-2009, and data analyzed 
a panel data model.  
Al-Baidhani (2014) investigated the effect of internal corporate 
governance mechanisms such as board structure, ownership structure, and 
audit function on bank financial performance in seven Arabian Peninsula 
countries. Regression analysis (OLS) is used to test the aforementioned effect. 
The results of this study reveal that there is a significant relationship between 
corporate governance and bank profitability. Danoshana and Ravivathani 
(2013) studied the impact of corporate governance on performance of financial 
institutions in Sri Lanka. Twenty-five listed financial institutions were 
selected as sample size for the sample period of 2008-2012. The data were 
collected by using the secondary sources. According to the analysis, variables 
of corporate governance have significant impact on performance- board size 
and audit committee size have positive impact on firm’s performance. 
However, meeting frequency has negative impact on firm performance. 
Naushaud and Malik (2015) ascertained the effect of corporate 
governance denoted by board size, duality, agency cost etc. on the 
performance of selected 24 GCC banks. The results indicate that smaller 
boards are more capable for monitoring the management closely in GCC 
banking sector. The presence of block holders in ownership structure of GCC 
banks tends to have a positive effect on the performance of banking sector. 
Zadollah  and Mohsen (2015) examined  the relationship between corporate 
governance  and  earnings  management  in  banks  listed on Tehran Stock 
Exchange using the variables ownership structure, board composition and 
block shareholding and multi- variate regression analysis method and 
concluded  that corporate governance has no significant effect on profit 
management. In a related study by Elbannan and Elbannan (2014) carried out 
in Egypt, block holders have a negative correlation with Egyptian bank 
performance. The result buttress that concentration of ownership may lead to 
exploitation of majority ownership over minorities that result in weak 
performance. Ogege and Boloupremo (2014) studied the relationship between 
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board composition and financial performance of banks in Nigeria. By the 
application of multiple regression analysis, it was found that board 
composition also improves profitability, one-unit increase in the ratio of non-
executive directors to total directors will increase profitability by the 
coefficient. The more non-executive directors sitting on the board, the better 
the financial performance.   Akhalumeh, Ohiokha and Ohiokha (2011) 
conducted a study on board composition and corporate performance in Nigeria 
with the variables return on equity, outside directors, board composition and 
board size using a cross sectional design. The result indicates that there is no 
significant relationship between board composition and performance.  
Fazel, Melati, Suresh, and Ali (2016) examined the effect of board structure 
on banks financial performance by moderating firm size in Malaysia using 
regression models. Board size, Board independence, return on assets were the 
variables studied. The findings showed that determinants of board structure 
have a significant effect on performance. Kumar and Singh (2012) using 
ordinary least square regression analysis for market based measure for board 
composition and bank size find a positive but insignificant effect on bank 
performance. Dika, Dibra, Brahimi, and Bezo (2013) studied the effect of 
corporate governance of the commercial banks in United States. They 
considered the extent of monitoring on such banks, board composition and 
takeovers, risk and capital structure, as well as ownership. It was discovered 
that corporate governance will be helpful in reducing the social costs derived 
from bank failures and poor bank performance. 
 
Methodology 
The study made use of the ex-post facto research design. The motive 
behind the use of ex-post facto research design is that the data for the study 
has already been published by reputable institutions and is considered to be 
valid for the study.  This study made use of fifteen banks that are publicly 
listed. The researcher carefully studied the data contained in the annual report 
of the banks that constitute the population of the study. The data used for this 
study were collected /derived from the published annual report of the banks 
that serve as the sample of the study. These banks must be banks that are listed 
within the period covered 2006-2018. This research adapted the model of 
Coleman and Nicholas-Biekpe (2006) with slight modifications. The original 
model is: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝐵𝐷𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
To determine the effect of different corporate governance variables on 
performance indicators, the above model is modified to examine the effect of 
corporate governance and bank performance. A panel regression gives more 
data variation, less collinearity and more degrees of freedom. These models 
are: 
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𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑃𝑀𝑡 =  𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐵𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐹𝑀𝑆𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐹𝐷𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 − −1 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑅𝑉𝑡 =  𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑆𝐻𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐹𝑀𝑆𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐹𝐷𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 − − − 2 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑡 =  𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐵𝐷𝐶𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐹𝑀𝑆𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐹𝐷𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 − − − 3 
 
Result of Diagnostic Test 
The p-value as depicted t-statistic is significant at 5% level of 
significance. The alternate hypothesis that the models are well specified could 
not be rejected. 
 
Breusch-Pagan Heteroskedasticity Result 
Model F- Statistic P-value 
1 8.644 0.034 
2 16.876 0.075 
3 23.806 0.000 
Source: Computer output data using E-Views 10.0 
 
Ramsey RESET Test 
Model T- Statistic Df P-value 
1 0.631 128 0.033 
2 4.464 128 0.013 
3 7.580 128 0.008 
Source: Computer output data using E-Views 10.0 
 
Normality of Residual Test 
Model     Chi-Square(2) P-value 
1 39.971 0.000 
2 230.726 0.000 
3 63.729 0.000 
Source: Computer output data using E-Views 10.0 
 
Unit Root Test Result: ADF Test Result at Level: Intercept 
Variables ADF Test Statistic Test Critical Value at 1% Test Critical 
Value at 5% 
Remark 
NPM -2.072 (0.26) -4.582 -3.320 Not Stationary 
GRV -2.894 (0.08) -4.582 -3.320 Not Stationary 
GNI  4.071 (0.02)** -4.582 -3.320 Stationary 
BDS -2.699 (0.11) -4.582 -3.320 Not Stationary 
BDAC -3.834 (0.02)** -4.582 -3.320 Stationary 
BSH -3.049 (0.07) -4.803 -3.403 Not Stationary 
BDC -1.913 (0.31) -4.582 -3.320 Not Stationary 
FMS -0.584 (0.82) -4.582 -3.320 Not Stationary 
FDS -1.369 (0.53) -4.803 -3.403 Not Stationary 
Source: Computer Output using E-Views 10.0. 
 
To ensure that the variables are free from stationarity defect associated with 
most time series data the unit root test was performed via Augmented Dickey-
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Fuller (ADF) Test and Philip Perron (PP). This test was performed on the 
levels data. 
 
Cross Sectional Relationship: Net Profit Margin and Board Audit 
Committee 
From the fixed effect model, board audit committee and firm’s size 
have positive relationship with net profit margin. On the contrary, the debt 
structure of banks has negative relationship with their net profit margin. Board 
audit committee has a positive coefficient indicating that if the ratio of 
independent auditors against auditors from management of the banks is 
increased, the net profit margin would rise by 19.88%.  
 
Pooled OLS, Fixed Effect and Random Effect Regression  
Dependent Variable: Net Profit Margin (NPM) 
Variables Pooled OLS  Fixed Effect  
 Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.   
C 96.078 0.234 107.671 0.182   
BDAC 0.498 0.755 0.198 0.907   
FMS 6.14E-09 0.010 4.63E-09 0.082   
FDS -1.304 0.000 -1.244 0.000   
R-squared 0.416  0.478    
Adjusted R-squared 0.403  0.431    
S.E. of regression 22.245  21.706    
Sum squared resid 64334.57  57483.20    
Log likelihood -603.796  -596.252    
F-statistic 30.963  10.191    
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000  0.000    
Durbin-Watson stat 1.767  1.671    
Hausman Specification Test 
 Chi-Sq. Statistic 7.462  
 Probability 0.048  
Source: Computer Output using E-Views 10.0. 
 
Growth of Revenue and Block Shareholding 
The Hausman test shows that the random effect model estimation is 
preferred as the p-value is insignificant at 5% level. The random effect 
estimation shows that block shareholding and firm’s size have a negative 
relationship with growth of revenue while firm debt structure exhibit a positive 
relationship with growth of revenue. The coefficient of the constant -54.397 
means that if block shareholding, firm size and firm’s debt structure are held 
constant then growth of revenue would depreciate by a factor of 54.40. The 
block shareholding coefficient of -0.463 indicates that a percentage increase 
in the current board size would result to 43.63% reduction in growth of 
revenue of banks. The coefficient value of -5.63E-10 for firm’s size insinuates 
that a unit decrease in the size of the firm would result in decline of growth of 
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revenue by a factor of 5.63 while a unit increase firm debt structure would 
result to a corresponding increase in growth of revenue of banks by 1.28%. 
The F-statistic of 1.907 and p-value of 0.131 indicates that the 
independent variables did not jointly and significantly explain the changes in 
banks revenue growth within the period covered by this study. The adjusted 
R-squared reveals that 2.00% changes in banks revenue was attributable to 
block shareholding, firm’s size and debt structure. The Durbin Watson statistic 
of 2.0 shows that the model is free from autocorrelation problem. In other 
words, return on assets, size of the board, firm’s size and debt structure are not 
correlated. 
 
Pooled OLS and Random Effect Regression  
Dependent Variable: Growth of Revenue (GRV) 
Variables Pooled OLS  Random Effect 
 Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
C -48.299 0.512 -54.397 0.466 
BSH -0.557 0.321 -0.463 0.425 
FMS -3.18E-09 0.775 -5.63E-10 0.962 
FDS 1.325 0.035 1.281 0.041 
R-squared 0.0456  0.042  
Adjusted R-squared 0.023  0.0200  
S.E. of regression 100.856  98.904  
Sum squared resid 1322447.  2.064  
Log likelihood -806.347    
F-statistic 2.072  1.907  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.107  0.131  
Durbin-Watson stat 2.065  2.064  
Hausman Specification Test 
 Chi-Statistic 0.904  
 Probability 0.824  
Source: Computer Output using E-Views 10.0. 
 
Growth in Net Income and Board Composition 
The fixed effect estimation entails that board composition and firm 
debt structure have negative relationship with growth in net income while firm 
size has a positive relationship with growth in net income.  
 
Pooled OLS, Fixed Effect and Random Effect Regression  
Dependent Variable: Growth in Net Income (GNI) 
Variables Pooled OLS  Fixed Effect 
 Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
C 69.318 0.404 55.019 0.490 
BDC -0.423 0.530 -0.471 0.466 
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FMS -1.00E-10 0.995 8.76E-09 0.619 
FDS -0.597 0.519 -0.502 0.578 
R-squared 0.006  0.153  
Adjusted R-squared -0.016  0.077  
S.E. of regression 150.377  143.247  
Sum squared resid 2939725.  2503428.  
Log likelihood -859.868  -849.100  
F-statistic 0.269  2.013  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.847  0.032  
Durbin-Watson stat 2.301  2.242  
Hausman Specification Test 
 Chi-Sq. Statistic 6.868201  
 Probability 0.046200  
Source: Computer Output using E-Views 10.0. 
 
The board composition coefficient of -0.471 implies that a unit 
increase in the ratio of executive to non-executive directors would lead to 
47.16% decrease in growth in net income of banks. The coefficient value of 
8.76E-09 for firm’s size entails that a percentage increase in the firm’s size of 
would result in net income of banks appreciation by a factor of 8.76. On the 
other hand, a percentage increase in firm’s debt structure would decrease net 
income of banks by a factor of 50.22. From the F-statistic of 2.013 and p-value 
of 0.032455, the fluctuation in net incomes of banks was significantly 
accounted by board composition structure, firm’s size and debt structure with 
the regard to the scope of this research. The adjusted R-squared value of 0.077 
is an inference that it is only 7.74% variation in net incomes of banks that was 
significantly explained by board composition, firm’s size and debt structure. 
The Durbin Watson statistic of 2.2 shows the absence of autocorrelation 
problem in the model. Statistic values in the range of 1.5 to 2.5 are relatively 
normal. Values outside of this range could be cause for concern. Field (2009) 
suggests that values under 1 or more than 3 are a definite cause for concern. 
 
Net Profit Margin and Board Audit Committee 
The positive effect of board audit committee on net profit margin 
shows transparency in financial reports. Finding of Al-Baidhani (2014), Umar 
and Mutiu (2016) for Arabian Peninsula and Nigeria respectively. It is also in 
agreement with Danoshana and Ravivathani (2013) whom noted that directors 
and audit committees that are independent from management should improve 
the firms' reporting system and the quality of reported earnings because they 
are not subject to potential conflicts of interest that reduce their monitoring 
capacity. The coefficient of the adjusted R-squared entails that 43.19% 
changes in net profit margin was attributable to the size of the audit committee, 
firm’s size and debt structure. Invariably, the current composition of audit 
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committee of three members within the management and three from 
shareholders as stipulated by Central Bank of Nigeria corporate governance 
code for commercial banks in Nigeria has positive effect on net profit margin.  
 
Revenue Growth Rate and Block Shareholding 
The negative relationship between block shareholding and growth of 
revenue is evidence that block shareholding does not increase the revenue 
growth rate of banks operating in Nigeria. This result is in line with the studies 
of Al-Baidhani (2014) and Wepukhalu (2016). It also supports the perspective 
of the agency theory that block shareholders are able to dominate the executive 
and management structure of firms by filling key positions; such owner 
managers are in a position to execute activities that benefit them but which 
may be detrimental to the interests of minority shareholders and the firm 
performance. The adjusted R-squared showed that only 2.00% changes in 
banks revenue was attributable to block shareholding even when it was 
controlled by firm’s size and debt structure. Thus, blocking shareholding by 
any institution is incapable of enhancing the revenue growth rate of 
commercial banks in Nigeria. 
 
Growth in Net Income and Board Composition 
The OLS regression reveals board composition has a negative 
relationship with growth in net income. This result might be that non-
executive director are not involved in day to day affairs of the banks; this will 
undermine their ability to monitor and advise the board because of the lack of 
the information that they have which will reduce the non-executive director 
ability to apply their function efficiently. This supports the works Umar and 
Mutiu (2016) for Nigeria and Srairi (2015) for GCC countries. It is observed 
from the regression output that the proportion of independent directors to the 
total number of directors does not increase the banks net income growth rate 
in Nigeria. This did not favour the agency theory postulation that greater 
presence of non-executive directors in the board safeguard shareholders 
interest and improve performance of banks in Nigeria. The Adjusted R-
squared indicates that only 7.73% variation in growth in net income was 
accounted by composition of board in the presence of control variables-firm 
size and financial structure attributed to the banks. Thus, the composition of 
the board cannot be said to be a determinant of net income growth rate of 
commercial banks in Nigeria. 
 
Granger Causality for Board Audit Committee and NPM 
The finding disclosed that board audit committee does not Granger 
cause net profit margin of Nigerian banks at 5% level of significance. Rather, 
it is net profit margin that granger cause board audit committee. There is a 
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unidirectional relationship between board audit committee and net profit 
margin, causality runs from net profit margin to board audit committee. The 
composition of the board audit committee does not have any significant effect 
on net profit margin, but the level of net profit margin exerts significant effect 
on board audit committee.  
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. Remarks 
BDAC does not Granger Cause NPM 
NPM does not Granger Cause BDAC 
 105 
 
0.027 
      14.961 
0.973 
   0.000 
No Causality 
         Causality 
FMS does not Granger Cause NPM 
NPM does not Granger Cause FMS 
 103 
 
2.482 
         0.457 
0.088 
   0.634 
No Causality 
         No Causality 
FDS does not Granger Cause NPM 
NPM does not Granger Cause FDS 
 105 
 
 0.950 
         4.217 
0.390 
   0.017 
No Causality  
         Causality 
Source: Computer analysis using E-Views 10.0 
 
The results revealed that board audit committee has no significant 
effect on net profit margin of banks.  
 
Granger Causality for Block Shareholding and GRV 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. Remarks 
BSH does not Granger Cause GRV 
GRV does not Granger Cause BSH 
 105 
 
1.435 
        0.498 
0.242 
    0.608 
No Causality 
    No Causality 
FMS does not Granger Cause GRV 
GRV does not Granger Cause FMS 
 103 
 
 0.554 
       0.058 
0.575 
    0.943 
No Causality 
    No Causality 
FDS does not Granger Cause GRV 
GRV does not Granger Cause FDS 
 105 
 
 0.606 
        0.163 
0.547 
0.849 
No Causality  
    No Causality 
Source: Computer analysis using E-Views 10.0. 
 
The regression output indicates that block shareholding does not 
Granger cause growth of revenue of banks in Nigeria. There is no 
unidirectional relationship between block shareholding and growth of 
revenue. No causality running from block shareholding to growth of revenue 
at significant level of 5%. The regression output disclosed that block 
shareholding has significant effect on growth of revenue.  
 
Granger Causality for Board Composition and GNI 
The regression result shows that there is no Granger causality between 
board composition and growth in net income of banks. Board composition 
does not granger cause growth in net income neither does growth in net income 
granger cause board composition at 5% level of significance. The firm’s size 
has no significant effect on growth in net income as it does not granger cause 
growth in net income at 5% significance level.  
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Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. Remarks 
BC does not Granger Cause GNI  
GNI does not Granger Cause BC 
 105 
 
0.175 
      0.055 
0.839 
0.945 
No Causality 
   No Causality 
FMS does not Granger Cause GNI 
GNI does not Granger Cause FMS 
 103 
 
0.191 
      0.235 
0.825 
   0.790 
No Causality 
    No Causality 
FDS does not Granger Cause GNI 
GNI does not Granger Cause FDS 
 105 
 
0.870 
      0.599 
0.421 
  0.550 
No Causality  
   No Causality 
Source: Computer analysis using E-Views 10.0. 
 
Conclusion 
Board audit committee is positively related to net profit margin of 
banks. Net profit margin exerts significant influence on board audit 
committee. Growth in revenue is negatively related to block shareholding and 
is insignificantly affected by block shareholding. Only 2% of change in 
revenue growth rate was attributed to block shareholding and control 
variables. The composition of the board has no significant effect on growth in 
net income. The relationship between board composition and growth in net 
income is negative, only 7.74% of variation in net income growth was as a 
result of changes in board composition, firm size and debt structure. The study 
concludes that a good corporate governance code should not be regarded as 
threat to entrepreneurial drive and spirit. A system that combines enterprise 
with integrity will promote good corporate governance without stifling 
initiative and creativity. 
 
 Recommendations 
The independence of the audit committee should be enhanced with 
respect to having more ratios of outside directors compared to management 
directors in the audit committee. This is on the bases of the positive 
relationship between the audit committee and performance. The holding of 
block shares of the banks by individuals, institutional investors or agencies 
should be discouraged because it has negative effect on performance. Block 
shareholding could induce the prioritisation of self-interest by block 
shareholders and the consequent expropriation of firm resources, resulting in 
decreased performance. Finally, the negative effect of board composition 
suggests the need for optimum proportion of non-executive directors in board 
for effective governance impacting performance of the firm positively. 
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